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Abstract
Spanish savings banks (SBs) are ﬁnancial institutions with a wide mission that includes diﬀerent stakeholders’ goals.
Proﬁt maximization is only one among several goals, and the widespread use of cost or proﬁt eﬃciency as the only com-
parative performance measure may prove to be insuﬃcient in this context. To overcome this problem, we build an aggre-
gate performance index for organizations with multiple goals. Furthermore, we show how the ownership structure of SBs
inﬂuences their economic behavior in two basic ways: (1) the performance level and (2) their goal priorities. In particular,
we distinguish two types of ownership structures in our application, namely, organizations controlled by Public Admin-
istrations and those controlled by insiders (i.e. managers and workers). Our results indicate that each type has diﬀerent
priorities and diﬀer in their performance indexes. More speciﬁcally, the empirical analysis shows that insider-controlled
SBs favor goals related to proﬁt maximization and the universal access to ﬁnancial services and, furthermore, they perform
better. In contrast, contributing to regional development becomes the most favored goal when Public Administrations
have a majority in the bank.

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1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the relationships
between regulation, ownership structure and eco
nomic behavior of Spanish savings banks (SBs) dur
ing the period 1998 2002. The three objectives we
aim to cover are: (1) an assessment of how regula
tion aﬀects the ownership structure and the objec
tive function of Spanish savings banks, (2) an
analysis of the eﬃciency levels and goal priorities
of these ﬁnancial institutions, and (3) an evaluation
of regulation eﬃciency. To achieve these objectives,
we employ existing methodological developments in
the area of data envelopment analysis (DEA).
Our analysis is related to two diﬀerent strands in
the literature on frontier eﬃciency analysis: one
focuses on the link between banks organizational
forms and frontier eﬃciency, while the other studies
value judgments in DEA models. Within the ﬁrst
strand, substantial research eﬀort has gone into
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1answering the question of whether bank ownership
inﬂuences economic behavior (Berger and Hum
phrey, 1997). In particular, previous studies have
examined the diﬀerential eﬀect on eﬃciency of
mutual versus stock owned banks (Cebenoyan
et al., 1993; Mester, 1993; Altunbas et al., 2001),
banks with stocks traded on capital markets versus
private banks (Tulkens, 1993), government owner
ship versus private banks (Altunbas et al., 2001),
foreign versus domestic banks (Chang et al., 1998;
Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Fukuyama et al., 1999;
Sathye, 2001), minority versus non minority owned
banks (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992), and small
versus large banks (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995),
among others. Concerning the Spanish banking
industry, there are several studies (Grifell Tatje ´
and Lovell, 1997; Tortosa Ausina, 2003) that have
assessed the eﬃciency of savings banks and com
mercial banks, postulating whether the diﬀerences
in ownership between these organizational forms
may lead to diﬀerent eﬃciency levels.
One potential drawback of most applications in
this area has been the lack of the behavioral objec
tives of each organizational type at the time of com
puting eﬃciency. The measurement of performance
becomes a function of how well an organization
achieves its objectives (Piesse and Townsend,
1995), and in many of the previously mentioned
comparisons between organizational forms the
equality of objectives cannot be taken for granted.
For example, when comparing mutual banks with
other organizational forms, one should take into
account the complexity of the behavioral objectives
of these institutions (Worthington, 2004) objec
tives that are more closely related to the maximiza
tion of the services provided to members (Fried
et al., 1993). Therefore, proﬁt maximization does
not seem the most appropriate goal for measuring
the performance of mutual banks. Similarly, the
organizations we are interested in Spanish savings
banks pursue, by law, a wide set of goals. Further
more, given the absence of shareholders, making a
proﬁt becomes only one among several measures
of success. Due to the fact that the control of SBs
has been allocated, also by law, to several types of
stakeholders, each one with diﬀerent interests, SBs
try to demonstrate that they are well managed, peo
ple oriented, accessible to the individual, friendly to
the small investor, and in touch with the local com
munity (Serrano Cinca et al., 2004). Therefore, to
measure their performance, we need to go beyond
traditional eﬃciency indicators and look further
into the way they create value for their stake
holders.
Until now, however, a common feature of all
papers that evaluate the eﬃciency of Spanish sav
ings banks is the use of the very same indicators
analyzed in commercial banks. That is, by means
of productivity (Grifell Tatje ´ and Lovell, 1997; Pas
tor, 1995), costs (Lozano Vivas, 1998; Maudos
et al., 2002; Maudos and Pastor, 2003; Tortosa
Ausina, 2003) or proﬁts (Kumbhakar et al., 2001;
Lozano Vivas, 1997). Thus, previous studies have
all omitted the multiple goal nature of SBs, which
renders the use of only costs or proﬁts inadequate
as a way of measuring managers’ eﬃciency.
As mentioned above, this paper is also inspired
by the literature on weight restrictions in DEA. As
discussed in the comprehensive review by Allen
et al. (1997), the most widespread method for con
sidering judgments or preferences in DEA models
is the use of restrictions on weights. These restric
tions are imposed in an attempt to incorporate the
decision maker’s preferences into the assessment of
eﬃciency. Typically, the value preferences included
in previous studies reﬂected either top manage
ment’s or the researchers’ views on the relative
importance of inputs and outputs. To the best of
our knowledge, only two studies (Thanassoulis,
2000; Lins et al., 2007) have considered the regula
tor as a key actor whose preferences must be incor
porated in the assessments. In this study, we focus
on another kind of regulation: the regulation aﬀect
ing the ownership structure of organizations. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that regulator preferences on
outputs are expressed by means of the voting distri
bution in the governing bodies of an organization.
In this paper, data envelopment analysis methods
are used to elaborate an aggregate performance
index that combines multiple goals where proﬁt
maximization is one among several goals and it
also calculates the relative importance of each goal.
Some idiosyncratic features make this methodology
specially suitable in this context: DEA is quite eﬀec
tive in handling complex processes of organizations
that do not behave like traditional ﬁrms, but use
multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, or
when the weights (i.e., the relative importance)
attached to each input/output are unknown. Several
authors have acknowledged the potential of DEA
methodology to assess the performance of those
organizations that violate the behavioral assump
tions under which commercial banks operate.
Spanish savings banks constitute one of these
2organizations and credit unions provide another
example. Regarding this later type of organizations,
Fried et al. (1993, p. 253) argued, ‘‘since credit
unions are owned and operated by members, the
objectives of credit unions can be thought of as
maximizing the services provided to members. This
immediately suggests that proﬁt maximization is not
the most appropriate objective’’. Therefore, in sev
eral empirical works measuring the eﬃciency of
ﬁnancial mutual organizations, proﬁt maximization
is not assumed: Mester (1993) for savings and loans
in the US, Fried et al. (1993) for credit unions in the
US, Piesse and Townsend (1995) for British building
societies, or Worthington (1998, 2004) with credit
unions in Australia.
We use the above methodological proposal in
comparing eﬃciency under multiple goals in the case
of Spanish savings banks. We consider the existing
agency relationship between the executive managers
of the savings bank (the agents) and the legislator
(the principal), who establishes a wide mission for
the bank. Accordingly, a savings bank’s manager
should replace the proﬁt maximization goal with
the maximization of the aggregated goals included
in the mission. Yet, agents have their own prefer
ences on how to combine those multiple goals, and
these are not always coincident with the legislator’s.
Thus, our measure of performance incorporates this
multiplicity of goals and, subsequently, it includes
legislator preferences on those multiple goals. Fur
thermore, we assume these preferences are implicitly
expressed in the voting distribution among stake
holders, through the percentages established by the
legislator in the general meeting. By adding this con
straint (i.e., the voting distribution) to the DEA
model, we enhance the analysis, deﬁning what the
legislator considers best practice, and we also make
comparisons between management choices and leg
islator preferences. Then, the overall eﬃciency of a
SB will be a measure of the agent’s ability to take
decisions in an economically eﬃcient manner while
satisfying regulator preferences. Similarly, ineﬃ
ciency will measure the failure to optimally allocate
goals into the transformation process following reg
ulator preferences on outputs. Besides, the measure
of convergence between the preferences of managers
and regulator preferences becomes an indication of
the eﬀectiveness of ownership regulation.
This study contributes to the operational research
literature by highlighting the potential of applying
certain methods developed in this ﬁeld to analyze
new economic problems with clear practical and
political implications. In this sense, dual DEA pro
grams provide relevant information, the multipliers
or weights, which also indicate the relative impor
tance (i.e., the order) of outputs. Therefore, as a ﬁrst
contribution, this paper investigates whether it is
possible to elucidate if diﬀerent ownership structures
imply diﬀerent output rankings. Moreover, DEA
allows the inclusion of given preferences that are
incorporated into performance assessment through
restrictions on weights. In a context like the Spanish
banking industry, where organizations commercial
banks, SBs and credit cooperatives compete on
prices or quality of services, with little regulatory
restrictions on these variables, the government may
inﬂuence SBs’ economic behavior through the com
position of the governing bodies. It allocates control
to diﬀerent stakeholders and deﬁnes the vote distri
bution among them. Consequently, in this paper,
we consider that regulator preferences over outputs
are deﬁned by means of the current legislation on
SBs’ governing bodies a type of weight restriction
not previously considered in the DEA literature.
More importantly, the comparison of eﬃciency
scores and weights of DEA programs with and with
out weight restrictions will allow us to measure the
eﬀectiveness of such a regulatory policy. The result
of this comparison has important practical implica
tions in Spain where there is a hot debate over the
future of this organizational form. The discussion
focuses on the appropriateness of reducing public
participation in the ownership structure of SBs in
order to improve their eﬃciency.
In addition, through these new avenues of appli
cation of DEA methods, we are advancing the
understanding of the eﬀects that ownership struc
ture has on the economic behavior of organizations
in four important ways. First, we measure the per
formance of organizations with multiple goals, for
which proﬁt maximization (or cost minimization)
is only one among several goals to be achieved. Sec
ond, we examine in detail the ownership structure
of organizations, describing diﬀerences in the
composition of general meetings within the same
organizational form. In particular, we empirically
investigate the eﬀect that diﬀerent compositions of
general meetings exert on the degree of achievement
of corporate goals, and we also test if managers take
into account stakeholder preferences at the time of
establishing goal priorities. Third, we build an
aggregate measure of performance that incorporates
the various diﬀerent regulatory constraints faced
by managers in diﬀerent ownership types, that is,
3diﬀerent legislator preferences over multiple goals.
Finally, we extend the empirical evidence of the
eﬀects of public ownership on eﬃciency, explaining
the possible causes of ineﬃciency.
The remainder of this article is structured as fol
lows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review the key features
of savings banks to deﬁne their mission and identify
the stakeholders. In Section 3, we present the rela
tionship between the proposed methodology and
the underlying economic problem. The data and
variables used in the empirical application are
described in Section 4; the results appear in Section
5, and sensitivity analyses in Section 6. The paper
ends with a discussion of the results, limitations
and conclusions.
2. Spanish savings banks: Mission, stakeholders,
ownership structures and regulator preferences
SBs compete among themselves, with commercial
banks, and with credit cooperatives. Therefore, they
are subject to the general discipline of the loan and
deposit markets. This competition is particularly
relevant now, after a deregulation process that
demands from savings banks similar levels of eﬃ
ciency to their private competitors (Kumbhakar
et al., 2001). In institutional terms, SBs are private
foundations and, as such, their social function
requires that part of their proﬁts be allocated to
activities that improve the well being of the region
where they belong. Moreover, in the absence of
shareholders, the ownership of these banks corre
sponds to the various diﬀerent groups represented
in the general meeting and, therefore, ownership is
not the result of a purchase or exchange as is the
case for commercial banks. Even more interesting
for our purposes is the presence of multiple goals
that the regulator explicitly includes in the savings
banks’ mission.
2.1. Mission and stakeholders
The current situation is mostly the result of Law
31/1985, (known as LORCA), which favored the
inclusion of the interests of the regions where sav
ings banks are present, along with a more profes
sional management of SBs. Thus, on the one
hand, savings banks could adapt to the peculiarities
of their region, looking for a greater implication of
SBs in regional development and, on the other
hand, they have experienced an organizational
change, trying to balance the interests of the various
diﬀerent social groups. Current regulation estab
lishes the composition of the governing bodies (gen
eral meeting, board of directors and control
commission) of savings banks with representatives
from four social groups: 15 45% of the seats for
the representatives of depositors, employees take
5 15% of the seats, founder entities take 10 35%
and, ﬁnally, between 15% and 45% of the seats are
for the public administrations (City Halls, Local
and Regional governments).
The result of this particular evolution of the SBs is
a group of organizations whose legal nature resem
bles that of ‘‘commercial non proﬁt organizations’’
in the words of Hansmann (1996). They undertake
the typical activities of banks, searching for eco
nomic eﬃciency and proﬁt maximization but their
proﬁts go mostly to social programs and charity.
All these features allow us to talk of multiple
goals for SBs; that is, a wide mission justiﬁed by
the presence of stakeholders represented in the gov
erning bodies.
1 Table 1 summarizes the various dif
ferent goals of SBs. As a summary of this, we deﬁne
the SBs mission in the following terms: ‘‘SBs help to
make ﬁnancial services a universal service, rendered
under conditions of economic eﬃciency, preventing
abuses of market power, while at the same time con
tributing both to a better allocation of the created
wealth and to the sustained development of those
regions where they are present’’.
2.2. Ownership structures and regulator preferences
In terms of ownership structure, Spanish savings
banks can be divided into two groups. The ﬁrst
includes those savings banks controlled by public
administrations (henceforth, public SBs); that is,
those savings banks in which the public administra
tions (PA) hold more than 50% of the votes in the
general meeting of the savings bank. To calculate
this, we add local, provincial and regional PAs,
along with public founders. The second group is
formed by savings banks controlled by insiders
(henceforth, insider SBs); that is, savings banks in
which employees, depositors and private founders
account for 50% or more of the votes.
2
1 Although not directly represented in the governing bodies, the
regulator also pursues its own goals and, for example, the Bank
of Spain plays an active role in monitoring the banks’ solvency.
2 Incidentally, this distinction also responds to the European
authorities’ concern regarding the role of banks controlled by
public administrations.
4Voting distribution among the stakeholders not
only implies diﬀerences in ownership structure, it
can also reveal the preferences of the regional admin
istrations on a bank’s goals, which by law have
competence to rule on the governing bodies’ compo
sition. In this matter, legislator preferences are
implicitly expressed through the voting distribution
among stakeholders in the general meeting.
In public SBs, when the legislator explicitly allo
cates more than 50% of the votes in the general
meeting to public administrations, the legislator is
showing a preference for the goals attached to this
group of stakeholders. As shown in Table 1, the
goals of universal access, competition enhancement
and regional development should be favored over
proﬁt maximization and wealth redistribution.
On the other hand, if the legislator allocates the
control of savings banks to insiders, the order of
priorities will favor the goals attached to employees,
depositors and private founders. That is, the legisla
tor is showing a preference for proﬁt maximization
and growth over other goals, as depicted in Table 1.
In insider SBs, the group formed by managers
and workers enjoy the control, due to the limited
ability of depositors the group that typically has
the largest percentage of votes to inﬂuence the
functioning of savings banks. There are at least
two reasons that support this fact: (1) depositors’
goals are already protected by means of a debt con
tract, deposit insurance and an exit option with low
costs. (2) The system of electing their representatives
(a lottery and a ﬁxed period of time) along with the
limited power they hold (one delegate, one vote)
make it extremely diﬃcult for this group to act in
a coordinated way. In fact, managers exert a
remarkable inﬂuence on this group. Employees, on
the other hand, maintain a stable and lasting rela
tion with the organization and, furthermore, they
have quite homogeneous preferences. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to think that employees share
decision power with the managers, as both groups
show a clear preference for the entity’s growth. Cer
tainly, growth implies more reputation and power
for managers, along with salary improvements and
the possibility of becoming more independent in
their decision making. For employees, growth
means more opportunities for internal promotion
and wage increases. At the same time, both groups
also pursue the goal of proﬁt maximization, needed
to preserve their jobs and to justify wage increases.
According to this view, some rewards to workers
(e.g., generous salaries) are simple self entrench
ment strategies for incumbent CEOs to avoid their
replacement (Pagano and Volpin, 2005).
Last but not least, the legal nature of savings
banks makes them more dependent on their ability
to grow through the use of internal funds. Given
the above, we interpret that the allocation of control
to insiders shows legislator preference for growth
and proﬁt maximization.
3. Measuring savings banks’ performance with DEA
Here we describe the methodology used to ana
lyze how diﬀerent ownership structures contribute
to the achievement of the goals included in the
Table 1
Mission and stakeholders for the Spanish savings banks
Mission goals Description Stakeholders
















y4: Make a contribution to social welfare and wealth
distribution
Provide services of not-for-proﬁt and charitable nature Founders
y5: Make a contribution to regional development Take notice of the genuine interests of the territory Public
Administrations
5mission of Spanish savings banks. Data Envelop
ment Analysis (DEA) techniques turn out to be, in
our opinion, particularly relevant in this case for
three reasons. First, DEA does not try to estimate
the form of the production function, but it uses exist
ing observations to elaborate a non parametric
empirical frontier where the exact form of the func
tion that relates inputs and outputs is unknown.
Nevertheless the non parametric, statistical proper
ties of DEA estimators are well discussed in several
papers (Banker, 1993, 1996). By applying DEA, we
obtain an aggregate performance index for each SB
in comparison to the rest of observations. This index
measures the distance between a particular SB and
the frontier. Secondly, by means of a dual transfor
mation of the DEA maximization programs, it
becomes possible to assign weights to each of the
multiple goals. The only assumptions are that each
observation should be placed on the extreme frontier
or below it, and that the set of weights must be fea
sible for any of the sample observations. Finally,
these techniques oﬀer the possibility of including a
priori information on the relative importance of
the variables (Golany, 1988; Thomson et al., 1990;
Roll and Golany, 1991; Allen et al., 1997; Halme
et al., 1999; Joro et al., 2003). More speciﬁcally, if
we restrict the weight values associated to the vari
ables, we will be able to calculate a new aggregate
performance index that takes into account a given
preference relation among goals. We now proceed
to analyze these three issues formally.
3.1. Multiplicity of goals and DEA
We focus on the agency relationship between the
diﬀerent stakeholders and the bank’s management
team. The contract that regulates this relationship
establishes that the principal delegates to the man
agers of the bank i, i ¼ 1;...;I, the task of trans





the goals or outputs that stakeholders are interested




þ. If each savings bank uses
diﬀerent quantities of these n inputs to obtain these
m outputs, we will construct the set of production
possibilities from the data




















and satisﬁes the free input and output disposability
conditions. This set also fulﬁlls convexity and the
monotonicity assumptions (Banker and Thrall,
1992) and, furthermore, the technology described
in (1) exhibits variable returns to scale (VRS). We
shouldmentionthatSpanishSBsdiﬀerwidelyinsize,
operational activity, objectives and geographical
market. All this leads us to favor a model with VRS.
Once the set of production possibilities T is
deﬁned, we formulate the problem of measuring
SBs eﬃciency. We use an output oriented DEA
model to analyze the eﬀect that the governance char
acteristics of SBs exert on the fulﬁllment of their
mission. The implicit assumption here is that man
agement teams aim at maximizing output levels
(i.e., the ﬁve goals) while keeping the input levels.
The optimization problem for a given SB ‘‘   ’’ can
be written as the following linear program, solved I




































The solution to (2), h
   P 1, represents the pro
portion by which the ﬁve outputs or goals of the ana
lyzed SB must be increased to move a given bank to
the production possibilities frontier (i.e. the frontier
of good practices). Therefore, a bank will be eﬃcient
only if h
   ¼ 1. The inverse of this value is an aggre
gate index of performance, IP
  , the value of which
quantiﬁes, in relative terms, how well managers use
the inputs to obtain the maximum level of outputs
for stakeholders. Consequently, ð1 IP
  Þ measures
the degree of ineﬃciency. Non negative values of k
  
identify the reference set for the evaluated SB; i.e.,
the set of banks that deﬁne the section of the frontier
where that SB is projected. For those cases in which
a SB is located on the frontier, we will have k
 

















































6Program (3) is solved I times as well, and it
allows us to simultaneously identify /
 , which is a
measure of the possible existence of economies of
scale, and the optimal output and input weights
(or multipliers) for each SB, denoted by l 
j and v 
k
respectively. In doing so, we assume that with the
set of weights of the evaluated SB no other entity
obtains a value for IP
   over 1 (the point of
maximum eﬃciency corresponding to the frontier).
Moreover, the duality theorem guarantees that
solutions to programs (2) and (3) become identical.
The weights that solve program (3) represent
each SB’s achievement of goals (Caporaletti et al.,
1999), and there is no other weight combination
that, given the possibilities of transformation of this
technology, provides a higher performance index
(Allen et al., 1997) for the evaluated SB. Therefore,
we interpret these weights as a measurement of the
relative importance that a given SB confers on its
goals. Such weights will be the result of private
negotiations between the diﬀerent stakeholders.
Next, we modify program (3) so that we can
incorporate legislator preferences. Thus, we con
struct a second performance index to evaluate the
managers’ performance in terms of the a priori
order of priorities. By comparing both indexes
we can identify and measure how accurate the
managers’ interpretation of the legislator prefer
ences is.
3.2. Legislator preferences and DEA
The inclusion of legislator preferences into pro
gram (3) imposes additional restrictions on weights.
Provided that these weights represent the relative
importance of each goal, legislator preferences are
expressed in the form of a given arrangement of
the goals included in the mission. Therefore, the
additional restrictions to program (3) could be writ
ten in terms of marginal rates of transformation
(Thomson et al., 1990) or by means of an ordinal








where ðr;s;tÞ denote outputs. An interesting advan
tage of doing so is that we only need to arrange the
weights according to legislator preferences, that is,
there is no need to establish the lower or the upper
limit. Such a feature is particularly relevant here
where the information concerning the composition
of the general meeting only allows us to arrange
the goals.
According to Section 2, when the legislator allo
cates control to the public administrations, prefer
ences favor the goals of universal access (y1),
competition enhancement (y3) and regional develop
ment (y5). Without further additional information
to arrange priorities, we can represent such prefer
ences in the following way:
l1;l3;l5 P l2;l4: ð5Þ
Similarly, the legislator’s preference for those
goals associated with insiders, that is, universal ser
vice (y1) and proﬁt maximization (y2) could be
expressed with another set of additional constraints
on weights:
l1;l2 P l3;l4;l5: ð6Þ
DEA techniques contemplate the inclusion of
restrictions on weights, like Eqs. (5) and (6) into
program (3), and as a result we obtain a value,
IPR
  
R 2½ 0;1  (where R stands for restricted), which
is our second performance index. IPR
   indicates
the ability to produce, given the transformation pos
sibilities of the technology and the preferences of the
‘‘social planner’’, the highest levels of outputs
ðyi
1;...;yi
5Þ from the ﬁxed endowments of inputs
ðxi
1;...;xi
nÞ. With this new index, we can measure
the contribution of a bank’s managers to welfare
maximization. Thus, ð1 IPR
  Þ indicates the dis
tance between the current decisions and the legisla
tor’s good practice frontier.
Obviously, adding constraints implies a decrease
in the performance index, unless the managerial
decisions respect the legislator priorities on goals.
Therefore, 1 P IP
   P IPR
  . Moreover, by com
paring these two indexes we can calculate a third,





   6 1: ð7Þ
This AE index enables us to evaluate how accu
rately a manager has implemented the principal’s
directives at the time of taking decisions. If manag
ers do respect legislator priorities, the IP
   perfor
mance index, and the one using restrictions on
weights, IPR
  , will be equivalent and allocative
ineﬃciency will not occur, (i.e., AE ¼ 1Þ. In general,
one can always decompose the global performance
index into the initial performance and the allocative
eﬃciency,
IPR
   ¼ IP
     AE: ð8Þ
7In the following section we show an application
of these indexes and measures to the case of Spanish
savings banks.
4. Data and variable description
The data used in this paper is extracted from the
Statistical Yearbook of the Confederation of Sav
ings Banks (published by the Spanish Confederation
of Savings Banks). We complement this data with
three additional sources: the Economic Bulletin of
the Bank of Spain, the Green Book of Financial
Institutions and individual annual reports. The
empirical application covers the period 1998 2002,
and we construct a pool of all the savings banks
contained in the Record of Entities of the Bank of
Spain. Thus, the total number of SBs in our sample
is of 50, 49, 47, 46 and 46 in the years 1998, 1999,
2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively.
3 The decision to
pool the data is explained by the proportion of the
number of annual observations with respect to the
number of variables used. Dyson et al. (2001)
described a rule of thumb for a DEA model to
achieve a reasonable level of discrimination between
eﬃcient and ineﬃcient observations. Such condition
is not satisﬁed here for all the annual data and,
therefore, we decided to pool the data.
Our sample includes 226 observations (savings
bank year). We exclude four observations from
the initial sample (238) due to missing data.
4
Besides, and as a prior step to the estimation of per
formance, we analyze the presence of outliers. As is
well known, the analysis of eﬃciency with determin
istic DEA models is quite sensitive to the presence
of outliers in the sample. This is due to the fact that
the frontier could be determined by observations
that are extreme points, and this might aﬀect the
eﬃciency evaluation for the rest of entities. In order
to overcome these problems, we applied Wilson’s
(1995) proposal to deal with extreme observations.
After this, we exclude eight additional observations
from the sample: Municipal de Burgos (all years),
Municipal de Vigo (year 1998), Pollensa (year
1999) and Manresa (year 2000).
The next step in modeling SBs eﬃciency is the
speciﬁcation of inputs and outputs of the produc
tion process. A survey of the diﬀerent conceptual
approaches can be found in Berger and Humphrey
(1997). Here, we follow the production approach,
since it deals with our main objective: to explain
how closely a SB moves toward its multiple goals.
The analysis focuses on service production and the
stakeholders’ objectives attained by each SB. More
speciﬁcally, service production requires the con
sumption of physical and material inputs, as well
as human resources. Consequently, we select three
inputs closely related to these three resources: staﬀ,
the use of capital in terms of depreciation, and the
use of other inputs.
Furthermore, we select ﬁve outputs that repre
sent the goals included in the banks’ mission. The
ﬁrst goal consists in providing universal access to
ﬁnancial services, that is, the promotion of savings
among the popular classes, preventing their exclu
sion from the ﬁnancial system and trying, at the
same time, to move these services closer to all citi
zens and locations in the territory. We evaluate
the contribution of a ﬁnancial institution to the pre
vention of social exclusion (or lack of banking activ
ity) through a territorial dimension the proportion
of branches in villages and small towns and
through the oﬀering of ﬁnancial services to custom
ers with low levels of resources, or small balances.
Accordingly, we use two proxies for this goal. The
ﬁrst is the proportion of branches outside the pro
vincial capital, which is measured by a Herﬁndahl
type index (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002).
5 High values
of this index mean that SBs locate their branches
in small towns. The second is the inverse of the aver
age balance of deposits (ABD), calculated as the
ratio of the total volume of deposits to the number
of current accounts, saving accounts and deposit
accounts. Low values of the ABD ratio imply that
the bank is rendering ﬁnancial services to clients
with low incomes (i.e., customers that generate a
high cost per unit of deposit).
The second goal is proﬁt maximization, that is,
the use of savings to obtain high proﬁts and avoid,
at the same time, bankruptcies or insolvencies.
Safety improves with the level of reserves, which
themselves are an increasing function of the savings
3 Three take-over mergers have taken place during this period.
In 1999, Vigo SB took over Ourense SB, and in the year 2000, it
took over Pontevedra SB. The same year Pamplona SB was taken
over by Navarra SB.
4 These exclusions are the Balearics and Carlet SBs.
5 These authors measure rivalry among SBs in geographical
markets but they do not consider the intra-regional distribution
of branches. We think that the ratio of branches outside the
capital over the total number of branches captures the idea of
proximity to customers more accurately.
8bank’s proﬁts. Therefore, we use the variable proﬁt
after taxes to measure this second goal.
Competition enhancement and avoidance of
monopoly abuse is the third goal included in the
mission of savings banks. To obtain better condi
tions and lower prices for customers would be the
updated version of combating usury, the traditional
goal. The contribution of savings banks to competi
tion enhancement within the Spanish banking sector
should be seen in the use of competitive prices; i.e.,
prices closer to marginal costs.
6 Because the public
accounts of SBs are not suﬃciently detailed, we
have not considered the possibility of approaching
prices through the average interest rate in the data
on Assets and Liabilities. Nevertheless, the Bank
of Spain publishes the (non regulated) interest rates
applied by ﬁnancial institutions to their clients:
prime rates, interest rates on overdrafts in checking
accounts and interest rates for exceeding the limit.
To measure the diﬀerence between price and mar
ginal cost in this case, we use the interest rate for
overdrafts as an indicator of price. We rely on the
fact that the people that pay such a price are pre
cisely those with less bargaining power (as opposed
to what happens with the prime interest rate) and,
consequently, the SB has leeway to exercise its
monopoly power on them. On the other hand, we
use the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks
reference on interest rates for assets published on
December 31 of each year as an approach to mar
ginal cost. Since the diﬀerence between price and
marginal cost becomes a measure of market power,
we use the inverse of that diﬀerence in our empirical
application as a proxy of the SBs’ contribution to
‘‘competition enhancement’’. Thus, the indicator is
the inverse of the diﬀerence between the interest rate
for overdrafts and the reference interest for assets.
The fourth goal is the contribution to wealth dis
tribution and welfare, measured by the amount of
resources that SBs spend on ‘‘obra social’’, that is,
services with a charitable or social character.
Finally, the contribution to regional development
could be understood as the provision of funds that
generate social externalities that the private sector
does not provide. This lack of interest on the part
of the private sector could be compensated by the
regional administrations. Thus, we calculate the
proportion of loans (in euros) granted to the Public
Administrations over the total volume of loans.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics. One
important methodological issue in this approach is
the use of multiple variables expressed in diﬀerent
units, percentages or indexes. This fact increases
the diﬃculties of estimating performance indexes.
Moreover, the measuring approach will also aﬀect
the calculation of weights and restrictions that rep
resent legislator preferences. Following the recom
mendations found in Dyson et al. (2001), we ﬁrst
express all variables in percentages and, later on,
we standardize each variable.
Table 2
Average input and output levels
Average 1998 2002 Full sample Insider SBs Public SBs






Outputs Average balance of deposits 6.0627
a 5.4887 6.4357
Herﬁndahl index 0.2644 0.2882 0.2490
Proﬁts after taxes 69,675
a 92,663 54,741
Interest rates for overdrafts 21.6859 21.4288 21.8529
Charitable-social programs 19,284
a 26,353 14693
Loans to public administrations 261,345
a 369,398 191,150
Number of observations 226 89 137
Notes: (a) Average values expressed in thousands of €. (b) Average values expressed in thousands of €/account. (c) Average value between
0 and 1. (d) Average value expressed in percentage.
a Signiﬁcant diﬀerences at a 5% level (ANOVA) within the two control models (insiders and public).
6 When ﬁrms compete in a non-diﬀerentiated market a ´ la
Cournot, proﬁt maximization requires satisfying the condition:
(pi ci,) (piÞ
1 ¼ Si jepj
1; where pi, ci, Si, ep denote price,
marginal cost, market share, and price-elasticity for the ﬁrm i,
respectively. Solving for market share and dividing by the ﬁrm j0s
market share, it follows that the ratio of market shares should be
equal to the ratio of margins.
95. Empirical results
5.1. Aggregate performance indexes under a common
frontier
Table 3 contains the summary statistics for the
aggregate performance indexes calculated using
the pooled frontier. In order to evaluate the man
agement of SBs, the performance index that incor
porates the preferences revealed by the legislator
(IPR) provides us with a measurement of the over
all eﬃciency attained by the bank. The IPR reﬂects
diﬀerences both in goal achievement (performance
index, IP) and optimalization of goal mix (alloca
tive eﬃciency, AE). According to the ﬁgures in
Table 3, insider SBs exhibited higher performance
indexes than public SBs in every eﬃciency measure.
The diﬀerences observed in performance indexes for
the insider SBs and the public SBs are all statisti
cally signiﬁcant, suggesting that insider SBs oper
ated closer to the pooled frontier than public SBs
did.
In particular, the average IPR for the insider
banks is 82.76% and 75.45% for public SBs. These
results indicate that those banks controlled by insid
ers could increase their outputs or the level of their
mission’s goals by 17.24%, on average, while keep
ing their current consumption of inputs constant.
This ﬁgure expresses the level of overall ineﬃciency
of insider SBs. For those SBs controlled by public
administrations, ineﬃciency increases to 24.55%.
In order to better explain the reasons for these num
bers, we break down the IPR index into two: the
performance index without restrictions (IP) and
the allocative eﬃciency (AE). As shown in Table
3, a larger proportion of the overall ineﬃciency in
the SBs seems to obey poor IP ratios and, to a lesser
extent, problems related to allocative eﬃciency. We
observe that insider SBs are more eﬃcient than pub
lic SBs when we maximize the mission without
imposing restrictions on weights. More speciﬁcally,
insider SBs reach an IP of 84.04%, while the aggre
gate performance index drops to 79.94% in the case
of public SBs. Concerning AE, eﬃciency reaches
98.53% when insiders have control, in contrast to
94.38% for public SBs.
Two main conclusions follow. First, managers
respect the priority order deﬁned by the legislator
in both types of SBs; the AE index attains values
close to 100% in both groups. Accordingly, the
overall ineﬃciency (IPR) of savings banks can be
explained, mainly, in terms of technical ineﬃciency
(IP). Second, according to the IP ﬁgures insider
SBs perform better than public SBs. This better per
formance of the insider SBs is mainly due to their
managers’ ability to use productive resources and
improve their stakeholders’ goals more eﬃciently
than public SB managers.
Table 3
Aggregate performance indexes: common frontier
Insider SBs Public SBs
PANEL A: summary statistics for performance indexes
IPR
Mean (standard deviation) 82.76% (15.46%) 75.45% (16.78%)
# SBs on the frontier 17 17
IP
Mean (standard deviation) 84.04% (15.75%) 79.94% (16.66%)
# SBs on the frontier 24 28
AE
Mean (standard deviation) 98.53% (2.83%) 94.38% (5.98%)
# SBs on the frontier 38 28
ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of performance indexes between insider SBs and public SBs
IPR 10.840 (0.001) 11.088 (0.001) 3.330 (0.001)
IP 3.402 (0.066) 3.825 (0.051) 1.956 (0.051)
AE 37.329 (0.000) 36.102 (0.000) 6.009 (0.000)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the legislator. IP: performance index as the result of private negotiations
among stakeholders. AE: allocative eﬃciency. The null hypotheses are that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the functions of
distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes for the insider SBs and public SBs are equal.
105.2. Aggregate performance indexes under
diﬀerentiated frontiers
The presence of diﬀerent ownership forms raises
an important issue: we must decide whether to com
pute eﬃciency by means of a single frontier that
includes all savings banks or, alternatively, a diﬀer
ent frontier for each bank type. The above results,
based on the use of a common frontier, would turn
out to be inaccurate if the hypothesis of identical
frontiers failed to be sustained. As Altunbas et al.
(2001) have already pointed out, two frontiers will
be more appropriate if each ownership type pursues
diﬀerent objectives, since in doing so technology dif
ferences will be controlled for. Moreover, Mester
(1993), who estimated a separate (cost) frontier for
each ownership type, argued that results obtained
under a common frontier confound technology
choice and ineﬃciency. Nevertheless, researchers
have rarely recognized the eﬀect of technology
choice on eﬃciency, and few scholars (Cebenoyan
et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992) have
tested the underlying technologies in their samples.
When no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found, the use
of a common frontier seems adequate; otherwise
comparing eﬃciency values obtained from a single
frontier becomes inappropriate. To test the hypoth
esis of identical frontiers (technologies) for insider
and public SBs, we apply a two stage test already
used in the DEA literature (Elyasiani and Mehdian,
1992). In a ﬁrst stage, performance indexes are eval
uated for the joint sample, assuming they share a
common technology. In the second stage, these
indexes are calculated for each subsample, assuming
the presence of diﬀerent technologies. Under the
null hypothesis, the ordering of SBs on the basis
of their performance indexes for the joint sample
turns out to be the same as that of calculating per
formance indexes separately for each subsample.
Then, if the null hypothesis cannot be accepted, as
is the case, we must evaluate the managers after
controlling for technology.
Table 4 shows the results of the test and suggests
that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the distri
bution functions (Kruskal Wallis) and the median
(Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes in the com
bined sample and the separate samples are statisti
cally diﬀerent, at a 5% signiﬁcance level.
Therefore, we must assume the use of diﬀerent tech
nologies for each type. Furthermore, this result is
independent of the performance index chosen for
the test.
Following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992), we can
also justify this technological diﬀerence between the
two groups of SBs by the idiosyncratic characteris
tics of each organizational model, either in terms
of its productive specialization or its organizational
characteristics. Regarding product specialization,
the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 indicate
that public SBs are smaller in size. This could
explain why these entities are more present in less
competitive regional markets (where they can oﬀer
services at higher rates of interest). On the other
hand, insider SBs are much larger in size and, pre
dictably, they participate in more competitive mar
kets where they must also face commercial banks
as competitors. Savings banks of such relevance as
‘‘Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona’’ or ‘‘Caja
Madrid’’ (ranked as No. 56 and No. 98, respec
tively, in the The Banker 2003 Top 1000 World
Bank ranking) belong to this group. Both their size
and the intensity of competition in the markets in
which they operate certainly demand more sophisti
cated management and, consequently, more quali
ﬁed managers as well. Moreover, these ﬁrms
achieve higher levels of eﬃciency.
Regarding organizational characteristics, we can
also say that ownership structure seems to have an
eﬀect on SB eﬃciency. More speciﬁcally, those SBs
with an ownership structure that allocates a major
ity of control rights to PA have lower performance
indexes. This indicates that a signiﬁcant presence of
PA inside the governing bodies excessively politi
cizes the ﬁrm, hindering decision making and exert
ing, eventually, a negative eﬀect on eﬃciency.
For the rest of the paper, we evaluate the man
agement practices of SBs after controlling for tech
nology. The common frontier results could still be
of certain interest, even when the null hypothesis
Table 4
Statistical test of equal technologies between insider and public
savings banks
ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
IPR 23.620 (0.000) 25.395 (0.000) 12.131 (0.000)
IP 13.502 (0.000) 12.663 (0.000) 11.177 (0.000)
AE 34.404 (0.000) 31.693 (0.001) 8.678 (0.000)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the
legislator. IP: performance index without restrictions. AE: allo-
cative eﬃciency. The null hypotheses are that the average of the
sample (ANOVA), the functions of distribution (Kruskal Wallis)
and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes for the
pooled frontier and the group-speciﬁc frontiers are equal.
11of identical technologies has been rejected. In partic
ular, the ﬁndings under a pooled frontier will rein
force and strengthen the results obtained from the
group speciﬁc frontier if both evaluations are con
sistent (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992, 1995). That
being said, the reported eﬃciency values can diﬀer
substantially between both estimation procedures
(as it can be seen by comparing Tables 3 and 5)
because group speciﬁc frontiers envelope the data
more closely.
In order to evaluate the management of SBs, the
performance index that incorporates the preferences
revealed by the legislator, IPR, measures the overall
eﬃciency attained by the bank. Due to the construc
tion of this model, all SBs now fulﬁll the externally
imposed restrictions. Thus, we evaluate manage
ment in an agency framework that speciﬁes the
goals to be reached and the order of preference
among them. The results in Table 5 indicate that
IPR is higher, on average, for the subsample of insi
der SBs, showing that they are, on average, more
eﬃcient in relation to their own frontier than public
SBs. The insider subsample frontier is formed by
those entities that, after ‘‘exhausting’’ the transfor
mation possibilities their own technology oﬀers, still
respect the order of priorities deﬁned ex ante by the
legislator. A total of 29 SBs form this frontier,
almost 32.58% of the subsample. Furthermore, the
distance between the remaining SBs and this fron
tier, that is, total ineﬃciency, can be quantiﬁed in
10.10%. The performance index of public SBs is
lower, 85.53%. In other words, their average ineﬃ
ciency amounts to 14.47%.
7
Table 5 also shows the results of the analysis on
how well the SBs maximize their mission when leg
islator preferences are not taken into account, the
above mentioned performance index (IP). As these
results show, when we maximize the mission with
out imposing restrictions on weights; i.e., when we
apply programs (2) or (3) to each subsample, we
observe that 31 entities lie on the frontier, or
34.83% of the group, reaching an IP of 90.32%. This
value indicates that, with the current consumption
of inputs, the outputs represent 90% of the transfor
mation possibilities that the technology oﬀers.
Therefore, to reach the frontier, insider SBs should
increase all their outputs by 10% on average, a ﬁg
ure that represents average ineﬃciency.
In the case of public SBs, 39 entities lie on the
frontier and the aggregate performance index drops
to 85.09%. From these results, we can state that the
management of insider SBs attains results which are
closer to their group’s frontier of good practice. In
Table 5
Aggregate performance indexes: Group-speciﬁc frontiers
Insider SBs Public SBs
PANEL A: summary statistics for performance indexes
IPR
Mean (standard deviation) 89.90% (11.61%) 83.53% (15.73%)
# SBs on the frontier 29 45
IP
Mean (standard deviation) 90.32% (11.60%) 85.09% (15.39%)
# SBs on the frontier 31 49
AE
Mean (standard deviation) 99.53% (0.92%) 98.09% (3.06%)
# SBs on the frontier 59 72
ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of performance indexes between insider SBs and public SBs
IPR 10.761 (0.001) 6.088 (0.014) 2.467 (0.014)
IP 7,507 (0.007) 3.410 (0.065) 1.847 (0.065)
AE 18.458 (0.000) 10.681 (0.001) 3.268 (0.001)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the legislator. IP: performance index as the result of private negotiations
among stakeholders. AE: allocative eﬃciency. The null hypotheses are that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the functions of
distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes for the insider SBs and public SBs are equal.
7 We have assumed a VRS DEA model. We have also tested the
case of constant returns to scale and the eﬃciency levels for all
SBs remain practically the same: 94.5% for public SBs and 97.4%
in the case of insider SBs.
12other words, they are more eﬃcient than public SBs,
if we deﬁne eﬃciency as the managers’ ability to
reach their goals with the productive resources given
and the preferences on goals determined by negoti
ation among the stakeholders.
Furthermore, we also evaluate the managers on
two lines: their skill in transforming inputs into
stakeholders’ goals and their ability to implement
legislator preferences. For this, we have calculated
the allocative eﬃciency (AE), as described in Eq.
(7). From the results shown in Table 5, one can
see that AE reaches values close to 100% in both
groups. In particular, when insiders have control,
AE is 99.53 and rises to 98.09% when SBs are con
trolled by a PA. It is interesting to highlight that,
despite the moderate decrease in the number of
SBs placed on the respective frontiers, the number
of allocative eﬃcient SBs increases considerably
(66.29% for insiders and 52.55% for PA), once we
include legislator preferences.
Managers seem to identify quite accurately the
legislator’s preferences as revealed in the composi
tion of governing bodies. Similarly, if we assume
that managerial decisions are the result of negotia
tion between various diﬀerent groups, and ﬁnal
decisions are taken according to given corporate
governance rules and stakeholders’ power, our
results indicate that there is no diﬀerence between
the formal allocation of control (through voting dis
tribution) and the real control eventually exercised
by each group. So, in practice, from the negotiation
process between stakeholders one obtains an order
of preferences not so diﬀerent from the preferences
deﬁned ex ante by the legislator. Consequently,
the diﬀerences in performance between both types
of savings banks will be better explained by the
managers’ ability to use their productive resources
in a more eﬃcient way and reach the goals pursued
by the stakeholders. In other words, the diﬀerence
observed in the IPR index does not respond so
much to a problem of interpretation of the legisla
tor’s preferences (allocative eﬃciency), as to a prob
lem in goals implementation (performance index
without restrictions, IP). Furthermore, these results
Table 6
Goals relative weights: Group-speciﬁc frontiers
Insider SBs Public SBs
PANEL A: summary statistics for goals relative weights










ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of goals relative weights between insider SBs and public SBs
With restrictions (IPR) (a) l1 8.601 (0.004) 9.638 (0.002) 3.105 (0.002)
l2 191.413 (0.000) 108.136 (0.000) 10.399 (0.000)
l3 43.412 (0.000) 56.645 (0.000) 7.526 (0.000)
l4 2.282 (0.132) 3.476 (0.062) 1.865 (0.062)
l5 49.472 (0.000) 95.272 (0.000) 9.761 (0.000)
Without restrictions (IP) (b) l1 6.681 (0.010) 6.917 (0.009) 2.630 (0.009)
l2 66.655 (0.000) 27.704 (0.000) 5.263 (0.000)
l3 6.126 (0.014) 1.046 (0.307) 1.023 (0.307)
l4 2.264 (0.134) 2.800 (0.094) 1.673 (0.094)
l5 26.666 (0.000) 32.000 (0.000) 5.657 (0.000)
Notes: (a) Weights are obtained by applying the program (3) ﬁrst to public SBs, and then adding restrictions (5). Similarly for insider SBs,
adding restrictions (6) to program (3). (b) Weights are obtained by applying the program (3) to each SBs subsample.
The null hypotheses are that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the functions of distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median
(Wilcoxon) of the goal weights are equal for insider SBs and public SBs.
13are independent of the frontier, and after control
ling for technology we can now attribute the lack
of eﬃciency in a particular type of SB to its
managers.
5.3. Priorities and control types
After verifying that allocative ineﬃciency turns
out to be very low, we focus on the identiﬁcation
of the mission’s structure. That is, we want to deter
mine the relative importance of each goal as the
result of private negotiation among stakeholders.
Later, we compare this with the preference order
deﬁned ex ante by the legislator.
The weights attached to each goal are obtained
from the application of the dual program (3) to
the two subsamples. According to the results shown
in Table 6, the goals that receive more attention in
insider controlled SBs are proﬁt maximization (l2)
and universal ﬁnancial service (l1), while enhancing
competition (l3) and regional development (l5) are
poorly valued. These results corroborate the initial
intuition that the allocation of control rights to
insiders has consequences on the choice of goals
ﬁnally implemented, conﬁrmed by their emphasis
on growth and the search for higher levels of proﬁts.
As far as public SBs are concerned, universal
ﬁnancial service (l1) and regional development
(l5) are the goals that receive larger weights. Com
petition enhancement (l3) is the goal placed in third
position, although the pairwise comparisons
between this weight and those attached to proﬁt
maximization (l2) and contribution to social wel
fare (l4) are statistically insigniﬁcant (Wilcoxon
test). It is also worth emphasizing that the last goal
forpublic SBs, in terms of relative importance, is
proﬁt maximization (l2).
Although not reported here, we have also run
this analysis with diﬀerences in bank size and the
main results remain unchanged. Nevertheless, as
size increases, the economic goal gains in impor
tance inside the objective function of insider SBs.
In fact, it becomes the only goal for SBs in the
fourth quartile (i.e., for very large banks, economic
performance receives a much larger weight com
pared to other goals).
Due to the characteristics of the optimization
program, both groups of savings banks respect the
priority relation entrusted to them by the legislator
(deﬁned in Eqs. (5) and (6)). Nevertheless, the infor
mation obtained by comparing weights before and
after the use of constraints is far from irrelevant
and it suggests possible ways for improving the
IPR performance of savings banks as we mention
later in the section of conclusions.
6. Sensitivity analyses
We conducted three additional analyses to check
the robustness of the above results. These results
conﬁrm the main conclusions of the paper. Now,
we brieﬂy summarize the motivation for and the
main ﬁndings of these analyses.
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We ﬁrst checked the inﬂuence of weight multi
plicity. As is widely known, DEA constructs a piece
wise linear surface, implying that, for each eﬃcient
ﬁrm (i.e., an observation that deﬁnes a vertex of
the enveloping frontier there is not just one but a
multiple number of weights that could be used (see
Rosen et al., 1998). Note, however, that the problem
of weight multiplicity is not applicable to ineﬃcient
observations: the optimal weights for ineﬃcient
observations are unique and these weights are deter
mined by the slope of the frontier where they are
projected). Therefore, if the average results pre
sented in Table 6, for weights without restrictions,
were calculated for ineﬃcient ﬁrms only, goal prior
ities would be exactly the same for the two types of
SBs.
Additionally, in an attempt to assess whether our
results are sensitive to other sets of optimal weights,
we used optimization programs aimed at computing
upper and lower bounds for output weights. More
speciﬁcally, we used a procedure deﬁned by Banker
and Thrall (1992, pp. 81 82). This procedure con
sists of replacing the objective function of the pro
gram (3) by Maxl 
j (to compute maximum
weights) or Minl 






  ¼ IP
   to the
constraints included in (3). After applying these pro
grams, we found that the weights shown in Table 6
belong to the interval of possible values for each
weight interval deﬁned by the maximum and mini
mum weights. Additionally, this new application
showed that the relative importance of each goal,
identiﬁed through upper and lower bounds on mul
tipliers, was consistent with the results discussed in
Section 5.3. Speciﬁcally, the results showed that
insider SBs give priority to the goals of proﬁt max
imization (l2) and universal ﬁnancial service (l1).
8 These tests were pointed out by two anonymous referees. Full
results are available upon request.
14Concerning the public SBs, universal ﬁnancial ser
vice (l1), regional development (l5) and competition
enhancement (l3) receive larger weights.
Second, we analyzed the relationship between
input/output measures and weights. One concern,
already pointed out by Sarrico and Dyson (2004)
and Dyson et al. (2001), is the dependence of abso
lute weights (those obtained from applying program
(3)) on the units of measurement of the input/output
data set. Their recommendation is to compute vir
tual input/outputs, that is, the product of the input
(output) level and the optimal weight for that input
(output). Proceeding in this way, virtual variables
become dimensionless and the results are easier to
interpret. We followed their recommendation and
the results were again highly consistent with those
ones reported in Section 5. The results from the
model without restrictions indicate that the goals
that receive more attention in insider SBs are proﬁt
maximization (l2   y2 ¼ 0:41Þ and universal ﬁnan
cial service (l1   y1 ¼ 0:34Þ; while enhancing com
petition (l3   y3 ¼ 0:06Þ, contribution to social
welfare (l4   y4 ¼ 0:09Þ and regional development
(l5   y5 ¼ 0:09Þ obtain low values. Similarly, uni
versal ﬁnancial service (l1   y1 ¼ 0:37Þ and regional
development (l5   y5 ¼ 0:26Þ become the goals that
receive larger weights in public SBs. Only the com
petition enhancement goal (l3   y3 ¼ 0:10Þ, for
public SBs, is ranked lower in terms of virtual goals
(proﬁt maximization, l2   y2 ¼ 0:14, and contribu
tion to social welfare, l4   y4 ¼ 0:13Þ, but these dif
ferences are statistically insigniﬁcant (Wilcoxon
test). This is not such a surprising result if we note
the small distance (also statistically insigniﬁcant,
Wilcoxon test) between its absolute weight value
(l3 ¼ 0:32Þ and the weights for proﬁt maximization
(l2 ¼ 0:27Þ and contribution to social welfare
(l4 ¼ 0:28Þ.
Finally, we studied in further detail the time evo
lution of the results when performing two kinds of
analyses. The ﬁst analysis consists of measuring
the productivity change over time by means of
Malmquist indexes. As discussed in Camanho and
Dyson (2006), this index performs comparisons rel
ative to year speciﬁc frontiers only, without pooling
the observations to form a common frontier for all
years. In turn, this index can be broken down into
two components: one measuring the catching up
eﬀect (eﬃciency change) and the other one captur
ing the shift in the production frontier (technical
change). The latter value is critical because only
when the annual frontiers share the same technol
ogy can the yearly data be pooled and, therefore,
may the eﬃciency scores be estimated relative to a
pooled frontier. The results show modest changes
in productivity during the period 1998 2002. The
technical change values are close to one in both
sub samples (insider and public SBs). This indicates
that the best practice frontier has remained immo
bile, suggesting that the use of a pooled frontier
with all years is a plausible solution and, further
more, its use in our application has not biased the
results. Starting from this evidence, we also calcu
lated the descriptive statistics for eﬃciency scores
and weights of each year in our sample, making
use of the group speciﬁc frontiers with pooled data.
The results of these analyses reveal several facts.
First, the goal priorities are stable for each sub sam
ple across years and are also consistent with the
results shown in Table 6. Second, the frontiers show
low stability, particularly in the insider SBs sub
sample: 14 diﬀerent ﬁrms (out of 22) have belonged
in at least one year to the eﬃcient set (18 of 30, in
the public SBs sub sample). Comparing both sub
samples, regularity is higher in the public group,
as ﬁve savings banks deﬁne the frontier in all years.
Third, untabulated results for the evolution of eﬃ
ciency show a decreasing trend in eﬃciency scores.
This result is independent of the indicator of perfor
mance employed (IPR or IP) and the sub sample
analyzed (public or insider SBs). We conjecture
that this result can be explained by the increasing
pressure placed on SBs to operate like commer
cial banks pressure that leads SBs to focus more
on the eﬃciency of their brokerage activities, pro
gressively avoiding some activities that revert
back to society (and penalizing their IPR and IP
scores).
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the connec
tions between regulation, ownership structure and
the economic behavior of organizations. We have
also argued that the Spanish savings bank (SBs)
industry may be an interesting case study for clarify
ing these relationships. There are several distinctive
features that make these banks interesting. Firstly,
they pursue a wide mission that explicitly mentions
several goals. Secondly, SBs are unlisted and have
an ownership structure where diﬀerent stakeholders
take part. In this sense, current European legislation
distinguishes between savings banks controlled by
public administrations and savings banks controlled
15by insiders. And thirdly, the legislator occasionally
interferes in the SBs’ decision taking, trying to
impose their own preferences through speciﬁc regu
lation on the composition of governing bodies.
Clearly, some of these features are also present in
other organizational forms such as publicly owned
ﬁrms, mutual ﬁrms and other non proﬁt organi
zations.
Taking these elements into account, we have
made use of several data envelopment analysis
(DEA) models to assess in the ﬁrst instance
the eﬀect of ownership diﬀerences on the SBs’ ability
to transform inputs into corporate goals. Then, we
have examined whether the legislator has succeeded
in imposing its preferences inside the organization.
By applying DEA to our data, we have built up
three performance indexes: technical eﬃciency,
overall eﬃciency and allocative eﬃciency indexes.
Using these indexes, SBs managers have been eval
uated on the basis of their ability to conform to leg
islator priorities (i.e. allocative eﬃciency), and their
eﬃcient use of resources to reach the ﬁrm’s goals
(i.e. technical eﬃciency). Additionally, we have used
DEA to obtain the weights attached to the goals.
These weights must be interpreted as the relative
importance assigned to each goal and, as such, they
are the outcome of negotiations among stakeholders
after taking into account some previously deﬁned
governance rules and the speciﬁc allocation of con
trol rights. Weight comparisons also become possi
ble in our analysis because each variable has been
previously standardized.
Our results show that the diﬀerences in the over
all eﬃciency of banks are not so much explained by
managers’ mistakes in interpreting the current legis
lation (allocative ineﬃciency is practically nonexis
tent), as by the presence of substantial diﬀerences
in the managers’ skills in transforming inputs into
goals for stakeholders (technical eﬃciency). These
results suggest that banks’ prioritization of goals
seems to be coherent, in principle, with legislator
preferences. More speciﬁcally, we have veriﬁed
how the voting distribution (established by the leg
islator) in savings banks’ general meetings has an
eﬀect on the goals to be reached and, furthermore,
follows the direction pursued by the legislator.
Thus, the goals of regional development and univer
sal ﬁnancial services receive more attention when
public administrations hold a majority of seats on
the governing bodies, whereas the attainment of
economic growth and higher proﬁts are the favored
goals when insiders hold control.
The main conclusion to be reached from this
research is that diﬀerences in the ownership structure
give rise to diﬀerences in SBs technology and their
priorities, including the importance attached to
proﬁt maximization. This is why we hold that sav
ings banks, in particular, and other multi objective
organizations in general, should not be evaluated
exclusively in terms of proﬁts (or costs), since they
pursue multiple and diﬀerent goals which, presum
ably, they would not carry out if their ownership
structure or their goal priorities were diﬀerent. Fol
lowing this argument, it does not seem reasonable
to evaluate managers in these organizations by their
economic results alone, especially when the legislator
(for example, by regulating the composition of gov
erning bodies) aﬀects the technological possibilities
of the savings bank and encourages managers to
pursue diﬀerent goals, which might even be in con
tradiction with proﬁt maximization.
Moreover, in our empirical application, we have
found that, by reducing the relative weight of the
public administrations in decision bodies (a decision
similar to that of partially privatizing a state owned
enterprise), the legislator is changing the structure
of priorities (i.e., it increases the weight of the
‘‘proﬁt maximization’’ goal to the detriment of
other goals such as ‘‘regional development’’) while
causing only a slight increase in the overall perfor
mance index (in our analysis, IPR). Global ineﬃ
ciency remains, nevertheless, high in our study
(around 10%). Hence, to the extent that the diﬀer
ences we found among the ownership structures in
the SBs sector are due to diﬀerences in technical eﬃ
ciency, any further reform should pay particular
attention to the eﬀects that new regulation may have
on enhancing the technical ability to transform
inputs into outputs, rather than in changing the mis
sion to favor more ﬁnancial oriented goals.
Our study can be extended in diﬀerent ways. First,
it may be of interest to pursue a more ﬁnely grained
analysis of regulator preferences. In this application,
and in accordance with European regulations, we
distinguished two types of banks: those where the
legislator has allocated control (more than 50% of
the votes) to public administrations and those where
thisthresholdof50%innotsurpassed.Fromthisdis
tribution of control rights we inferred the regulator’s
preferences over the goals; preferences that were sub
sequently incorporated into DEA assessments
through ordinal relations among weights. Therefore,
an attractive possibility for further reﬁning the anal
ysis of the impact of regulation on eﬃciency would
16be to consider the percentage of votes assigned to
each stakeholder. In this new scenario, it would be
possible to rewrite the constraints included into
DEA models. Moreover, proceeding in this way, it
would be also possible to deﬁne ﬁrm year speciﬁc
weight restrictions, as a function of the vote distribu
tion among stakeholders in its general meeting for
each year. As constraints become more severe, the
eﬃciency scores of assurance region models will
decrease, increasing allocative ineﬃciency.
Finally, future work should attempt to expand
the sample to include other organizational forms
such as commercial banks and credit cooperatives
that compete in the Spanish banking industry. Inter
estingly, these other types of banks also present sub
stantial diﬀerences in terms of regulation, ownership
structure and corporate goals. Thus, this richer data
set would allow us to examine in greater depth the
possible connections between regulation, ownership
structure and economic behavior. These issues will
be the subject of future research.
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